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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-ILLE-
GAL SEIZURE OF DERIVATIVE CONTRABAND BARS FOR-
FEITURE. United States v. $38,394 U.S Currency, 498 F. Supp. 1325
(N.D. Ill. 1980). Government agents arrested respondent and three
other persons in a first floor Chicago apartment on drug charges in
United States v. $38,394 U.S. Currency.' Immediately following the
arrests, the agents unlawfully searched an apartment on the third floor
of the same building, where they discovered and seized $38,394 in
United States currency.2 Prior to the trial on the criminal charges,
respondent filed a motion for the return of the money pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e).3 Following pretrial hearings on
the motion, the district court held that the agents had seized the cur-
rency illegally and ordered it returned to respondent. a The government
responded by filing an action for forfeiture of the currency.' The fed-
eral district court for the Northern District of Illinois held: When the
government obtains possession of currency by means of an illegal
seizure, the government is barred from maintaining forfeiture proceed-
ings against the currency.6
The fourth amendment protects persons and their property from un-
1. 498 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. Ill. 1980). The four defendants were also charged with unlawful
gun possession. Id. at 1325.
2. Id. The money had been stuffed in Crown Royal bags and placed in a closet. In the
subsequent criminal proceedings the court ruled that the government's seizure of the currency was
unlawful. The agents had no probable cause to make the seizure as an incident to the arrests. Id.
at 1326. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
3. FED. R. CuM. P. 41(e) provides:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for
the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground
that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property which was illegally seized. The
judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion.
If the motion is granted the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in
evidence at any hearing or trial. If a motion for return of property is made or comes on
for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or information is filed, it shall be
treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
4. 498 F. Supp. at 1326. Because the court ruled that the seizure was illegal, it was unneces-
sary to determine, as the government contended, whether the search was lawful. Id. at 1326 n.l.
5. Id. at 1326. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (Supp. III 1979) provides in part:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right
shall exist in them:
(6) All moneys... furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange
for a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such
an exchange, and all moneys. . . used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation
of this subchapter. ...
See notes 12-30 infra and accompanying text.
6. 498 F. Supp. at 1327.
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reasonable searches and seizures.7 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that warrantless searches are ' per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject to only a few specifically established and
well delineated exceptions." 8 The Court has attempted to ensure pro-
tection of fourth amendment rights by creating the exclusionary rule.9
Recently, the Supreme Court has cut back on the use of the exclusion-
ary rule in favor of other interests.10 Nevertheless, the Court has held
that the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule apply to forfei-
ture proceedings.'
Scholars have traced forfeiture actions historically at least as far back
as Roman times, when legal systems justified forfeiture as a form of
vengeance against instrumentalities of death or injury. 2 In the United
States, forfeiture is an in rem proceeding against property that Con-
gress has statutorily' a classified as "contraband."' 4 Forfeiture statutes
7. The fourth amendment assures that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated
...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment was enacted primarily in reaction to
"the evils associated with the use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in
the Colonies. . .and was intended to protect the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life .... from searches under unchecked general authority." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482
(1967).
8. Eg., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). "The purpose of the warrant re-
quirement in a forfeiture seizure case is to obtain a neutral magistrates determination of probable
cause to believe the government in fact has a superior possessory right to the property" befre the
property is seized. United States v. One 1965 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 453 (Ist Cir. 1980)
(Coffin, C.J., dissenting).
9. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court upheld the defendant's right to
petition before trial for the return of property procured through an unlawful search or seizure by
federal authorities. Id. at 398. Later, in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), the Court
held that such illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible in a federal prosecution. The Supreme
Court held that the exclusionary rule principle is applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
10. Critics of the rule emphasize the "Iligh cost to society" and the limited need to deter
wrongful police misconduct. See, eg., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (exclusionary rule
inapplicable in state habeas corpus proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (ex-
clusionary rule inapplicable in civil tax refund proceedings); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531
(1975) (exclusionary rule not applied retroactively-deterrence would be marginal); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to grand jury proceedings).
11. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
12. 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1007, 1008 (1979) (citing 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Howe ed.
1963)).
13. All forfeiture proceedings in the United States are statutory. Note, Bane of American
Forfeiture Law-Banished at Lazt? 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768, 769 (1977).
14. There are two types of contraband: contraband per se and derivative contraband. See 1
W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 85-86 (1978).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/20
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are technically civil.'5 The government has the initial burden of estab-
lishing that there was probable cause to believe the object was subject
to forfeiture when the government instituted the forfeiture action.16
Courts generally have held that the probable cause standard required
in forfeiture proceedings is that of reasonable grounds for belief of
guilt; more than mere suspicion, but less than prima facie proof.'7
Despite the civil nature of forfeiture,'" the Supreme Court has held
that fourth amendment protections apply to forfeiture proceedings. In
Boyd v. United States'9 the Supreme Court, observing that forfeiture is
Contraband per se is property that is always unlawful to possess. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1980). Examples of per se contraband include heroin, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 812, 881(1) (1976); "moonshine whiskey," 26 U.S.C. §§ 5686, 7302 (1976); and sawed-off shot-
guns, id. §§ 5861(d), 5872. The Supreme Court has indicated that an illegal seizure will never
require the government to return per so contraband. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951) (illegally imported narcotics); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1949) (unregistered
still, alcohol, and mash), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1980). The Court later noted that repossession of such per se contraband by Jeffers and Trupiano
would have subjected them to criminal penalties and the "return of the contraband would clearly
have frustrated the express public policy against the possession of such objects." One 1958 Plym-
outh Sedan, 380 U.S. at 699.
On the other hand, derivative contraband is property that is normally lawful to possess but has
become "contraband," and hence subject to forfeiture, only because of the illegal manner in which
it was used or intended to be used. Examples of derivative contraband include cars, airplanes,
and boats, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1976), and money, id. § 881(a)(6) (Supp. III 1979). See 40 OHIo
ST. LU. 1007, 1009-10 (1979).
15. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern appeals in forfeiture cases. See One 1961
Lincoln Continental Sedan v. United States, 360 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1966).
16. E.g., United States v. One 1972 Toyota Mark II, 505 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States v. United States Currency Amounting to the Sum of $20,294.00 More or Less, 495 F. Supp.
147 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
17. Proof of a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite to forfeiture of a person's property.
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-84 (1974); The Palmyra, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). Courts have held that the level of probable cause required in a forfeiture
proceeding is the same as the standard applied to search and seizure generally. United States v.
One 1974 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 199 (6th Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. One Twin
Engine Beech Airplane, 533 F.2d 1106, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1976)). The test is "whether at that
moment the facts and circumstances within [the police's] knowledge and of which they had rea-
sonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that" the
property in question was subject to forfeiture. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The
claimant may come forward and show that the facts constituting "probable cause" do not actually
exist. One 1974 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d at 199 (citing United States v. One 1975 Ford F100
Pickup Truck, 558 F.2d 755, 756-77 (5th Cir. 1977)). See 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007, 1010 (1979).
18. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. Generally, the exclusionary rule does not
apply in civil proceedings. See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 14, § 1.5.
19. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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a penalty for the property's connection with criminal conduct, recog-
nized the inherently criminal nature of the action.20 The Court, refer-
ring to such actions as "quasi-criminal in nature," declared that the
protections of the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures must apply to forfeiture cases.21
In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania22 the Court, relying on
20. The Court stated that "proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture
of a man's property by reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are
m their nature criminal." Id. at 634.
21. Id. at 633-34. The Boyd Court stated: "As... suits for penalties and forfeitures in-
curred by the commission of offenses against the law, are of [a] quasi-criminal nature, we think
that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment. . . ." Id.
22. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). The Court reaffirmed the principles established in Boyd and ~pn-
outh Sedan, see note 23 infra and accompanying text, and applied other constitutional principles
as well in United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971). The defendant
appealed from a forfeiture proceeding instigated by the government following defendant's convic-
tion for failure to comply with federal gambling registration and tax statutes. The court of appeals
had held that the defendant could properly assert the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination in forfeiture proceedings and ordered the government to return the seized money.
United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 393 F.2d 499, 499-500 (7th Cir. 1968) (per
curiam), afd, 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
The Court applied the Boyd principle, stating:
inhere is no difference between a man who "forfeits" $8,674 because he has used the
money in illegal gambling activities and a man who pays a "criminal fine" of $8,674 as a
result of the same course of conduct. . . [I]n both cases, the Fifth Amendment applies
with equal force.
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. at 718 (citations omitted).
Observing that "centuries of history" show that forfeiture statutes have an "extraordinarily
broad scope," id. at 719, the Court reasoned that the broad scope of the forfeiture statute in ques-
tion may raise serious fifth amendment due process questions, id. at 721. Thus, it is "manifest that
[forfeiture statutes] are intended to impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly in-
volved in a criminal enterprise." Id. at 721-22.
Coin & Currency reflects the Supreme Court's concern for protecting citizens' property against
the harshness of forfeiture proceedings. See United States v. One 1976 Buick Skylark, 453 F.
Supp. 639 (D. Colo. 1978) ("[f]orfeitures are not favored and should be enforced only when within
both the letter and the spirit of the law"). Thus, federal courts generally have followed Boyd and
ruled that forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and that fourth amendment protec-
tions apply. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 497 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Iowa 1980); Doherty v.
United States, 500 F.2d 540 (Ct. CL 1974). See also United States v. Alcatex, Inc., 328 F. Supp.
129, 132 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in which Judge Frankel wrote that "Boyd... is designed to expand
[the Fourth] Amendment's protection of privacy and security .... What the Government has
unlawfully seized, it may well have no business keeping simply because a proceeding is captioned
'civil."' Id.
Basic constitutional considerations also mandate that the protections of the fourth amendment
apply to forfeiture proceedings.
Though the consequences of noncriminal punitive proceedings are not infamous,
nonetheless the government is seeking retribution for legal transgressions. Conse-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/20
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Boyd, held that the exclusionary rule also applies to forfeiture proceed-
ings' and ordered the return of an illegally seized automobile. The
Court also indicated that an automobile is "derivative contraband" 24 so
that Pennsylvania could not establish an improper use of the automo-
bile without relying on evidence obtained through the illegal search
and seizure.25 Thus, the Court reasoned, petitioner's possession of the
"contraband" did not frustrate any public policy.2 6
The Plymouth Sedan decision did not, however, consider the effect of
a fourth amendment violation upon a forfeiture action when the gov-
ernment is able to prove its forfeiture case independently; that is, with
legally obtained evidence.27 There is some dissension among the lower
federal courts 28 that have addressed this issue.29 Most courts resolve
quently, such proceedings raise some of the same concerns that underlie the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination clause ... the concern, for example, that oppressive tac-
tics will be used to secure testimony and that testimony will often prove unreliable.
Clark, Civil & Criminal Penallies & Forfeitures: A Frameworkfor ConslitutionalAnalysis, 60 MINN.
L. REv. 379,417 (1976). It is unnecessary because the government has alternative means available
to attain its evidence-mainly, the constitutionally required search warrant requirement. More-
over, the fourth and fifth amendment protections are of a broader scope than the guarantees in
article III and the sixth amendment, which govern only criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., United
States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47 (1914).
23. 380 U.S. at 696. In Plymouth Sedan, the Supreme Court reviewed a Pennsylvania forfei-
ture statute that stated: "No property rights shall exist in any ... vehicle ... used in the illegal
manufacture or illegal transportation of liquor .... and the same shall be deemed contraband
and proceedings for its forfeiture to the Commonwealth may... be instituted. . . ." Id. at 694
n.2. Officers of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board had stopped an automobile they believed
was abnormally low in the rear as if heavily loaded in the trunk. Id. at 694. After conducting a
warrantless search of the car and discovering cases of liquor without tax seals, the officers seized
the car and the liquor pursuant to the statute. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reasoned that
forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature and upheld an action for forfeiture of the automobile
against petitioner's contention that forfeiture of the car "depended upon the admission of evidence
illegally obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment ...." Id. at 694-95. The Supreme
Court reversed. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). Plymouth Sedan is still good law, because the Court reap-
proved the case in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 n.17 (1976). See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra
note 14, at 84-86.
24. 380 U.S. at 699. See note 14 supra.
25. "There is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile. It is only the
alleged use to which this particular automobile was put that subjects [petitioner] to its possible
loss." 380 U.S. at 699. See note 14 supra.
26. 380 U.S. at 699. Public policy would be frustrated, however, by the return of per se
contraband, such as heroin, or the bootleg liquor in Plymouth Sedan. Id.
27. Although the Court in Plymouth Sedan remanded the case to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, it did so only to allow the state court to consider whether the search was actually illegal, "a
question which [the state's supreme court] previously did not consider necessary to decide." Id. at
702.
28. Compare United States v. One 1971 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.
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the issue by allowing forfeiture when the government can prove its case
with untainted evidence.3"
1974) (illegally seized property is subject to forfeiture when the government can prove its case by
evidence derived independently of the illegal seizure) with United States v. $38,394 U.S. Currency,
498 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (government not entitled to forfeiture when possession results
from illegal seizure). Until recently, the First Circuit has held that an illegal seizure immunizes
property from forfeiture. In Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168 (1st Cir. 1965), the First
Circuit held that the government cannot enforce forfeiture of money allegedly used to violate
internal revenue laws when it discovers and seizes that money only by a direct invasion of the
owner's constitutional rights that results from an unlawful arrest and search of the owner as an
incident to that arrest.
Relying on the Boyd decision, which the court characterized as the locus classicus to which later
judges have always returned for quotation, the court stated:
[W]hen the Government violated Constitutional commands it should not be allowed to
use its misconduct for its own advantage. Disregard of constitutional rights is not to be
ignored even if it would achieve some goal asserted by the Government of the day to be
superior to the permanent interest that the Constitution proclaims in leaving men to
enjoy their privacy.
id. at 170. See Melendez v. Shultz, 356 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (D. Mass. 1973).
The continued vitality of Berkowitz is doubtful. In a recent First Circuit case, United States v.
One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980), the court stated:
Even if a seizure for forfeiture purposes were not an exception to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement, it is not clear why an inadequacy in the procedure used to secure
initial possession would or should defeat the government's ultimate entitlement to the
property as established by untainted evidence at a properly conducted forfeiture
proceeding.
Id. at 450.
The court's decision in One Pontiac cannot be regarded as truly overruling Berkowitz. The
language quoted above is only dictum, because One Pontiac expressly held that the government's
seizure of the automobile did not violate the fourth amendment: "IT]he warrantless seizure, un-
dergirded as it was by probable cause, was constitutional." Id.
29. See generally Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 473 (1966).
30. See, e.g., United States v. One 1971 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.
1974); United States v. $1,058.00 in United States Currency, 323 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1963); United
States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 253 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 1958); Sanders v. United States, 201
F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v. Eight Boxes Containing Various Articles of Miscellane-
ous Merchandise, 105 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1939). But see Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168
(1st Cir. 1965); Melendez v. Shultz, 356 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Mass. 1973); Doherty v. United States,
500 F.2d 540 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
The Eighth Circuit recently decided a case squarely on point, United States v. $297,235.00, 516
F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aff'dsub norm United States v. $88,500, No. 81-1750 (8th Cir. Feb.
22, 1981). Appellant claimed that the district court judge erred by ruling that an illegal seizure of
money by drug enforcement agents did not bar forfeiture when the government could prove its
case by untainted means. Brief for Appellant at 30. Appellant also disputed the lower court's
finding that the government met its burden of proving that there was probable cause to believe the
money was intended to be used to purchase illegal drugs. Brief for Appellant at 15. The United
States, on the other hand, argued that "the mere illegal seizure does not immunize property from
forfeiture." Brief for Appellee at 22. The Eighth Circuit failed to address appellant's argument
that the cases relied on by the government, United States v. One Harley-Davidson Motorcycle,
508 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1974), and John Bacall Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 412 F.2d 586 (9th
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/20
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The court in United States v. $38,394 U.S. Currency3' found two is-
sues. The court first considered whether the "agents seized the cur-
rency 'acting under authority of law,"' as alleged in the government's
complaint.32 If the currency was not seized by the agents acting with
lawful authority, the court then found it necessary to determine
whether the "under authority of law" portion of the complaint was
"necessary to the government's action." 33 Because the court in an ear-
lier proceeding had held that the government's seizure was unlawful,
34
collateral estoppel precluded the government from "reasserting" in the
forfeiture action that the currency was seized "under authority of
law." 35 The court apparently assumed an affirmative answer to the sec-
ond issue. Implicit in the court's dismissal of the government's action,
with prejudice, and its order directing a return of the currency to re-
spondent, is a ruling that the premise "under authority of law" is essen-
tial to the government's complaint.36
The remaining question for the court was "whether the government
is then free simply to reinstate new forfeiture proceedings" after return
of the money to respondent.37 The court stated that possession of prop-
erty is a "condition precedent" to an in rem forfeiture proceeding. 38
Because the government would not have possession of the currency but
for its violation of respondent's fourth amendment rights, 39 the court
reasoned that allowing the government to return respondent's property
Cir. 1969), (see note 53 infra), were incorrectly decided. United States v. $88,500, slip. op. at 6-7.
The court of appeals upheld the forfeiture.
31. 498 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
32. Id. at 1326.
33. Id.
34. Id. Respondent relied on the transcript from the pre-trial proceeding on the criminal
charges to invoke his collateral estoppel claim. Id. The parties framed the collateral estoppel
issue as whether "probable cause" had been previously litigated. If the focus had been correct,
then "[respondents] motion for summary judgment would have to be denied." Id. The earlier
proceeding had resulted in a holding that the agents lacked probable cause to effect the seizure as
an incident to respondent's arrest. The question in the forfeiture proceeding, however, was
"whether. . . at the time the Complaint was filed 'probable cause [existed] to believe that the
[currency] has been used or is intended to be used in violation of' the chapter dealing with drug
offenses." Id. The latter issue had not been previously litigated. Id. See note 27 supra.
35. Id. The court stated: "Property of private citizens simply cannot be seized and held in an
effort to compel the possessor to 'prove lawful possession."' Id. (quoting United States v. One
Residence & Attached Garage, 603 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1979)).
36. 498 F. Supp. at 1326-27.
37. Id. at 1326.
38. Id. at 1326-27.
39. Id. at 1327.
[Vol. 60:705
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only to reseize it promptly would permit the government to profit from
its unlawful conduct.'
The rule adopted in $38,394 U.S. Currency4 is consistent with fourth
amendment policies and the Supreme Court's decision in Plymouth Se-
dan.42 A rule that immunizes from forfeiture illegally seized derivative
contraband comports with the underlying purposes of the exclusionary
rule.43
The Supreme Court has advanced two rationales to justify the exclu-
sionary rule: deterrence of unlawful police conduct and preservation of
respect for governmental and judicial integrity.44 Allowing the govern-
ment to reseize property and reinstitute new forfeiture proceedings
would not deter unconstitutional police conduct.45 Furthermore, this
questionable procedure would create serious doubts about governmen-
tal and judicial integrity.
Police officers are likely to view the forfeiture of an auto, or, as in
$38,394 U.S. Currency, a large sum of money, as the imposition of a
criminal fine rather than a civil penalty.' 6 Thus, a rule immunizing
illegally seized property from forfeiture arguably will have a deterrent
effect on unlawful police conduct equivalent to the deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule in criminal trials.4 7 A contrary holding, granting
40. Id. The court summarized its position:
This Court will not permit the government to take advantage of its own illegal conduct
to forfeit a citizen's property, nor to bootstrap itself by the return and prompt reseizure of
the property (whose present location it would have no knowledge of but for its own
unlawful conduct in the initial seizure).
Id. (citing United States v. One 1976 Cadillac Seville, 477 F. Supp. 879, 882, 884-85 (E.D. Mich.
1979)). The court also noted that Plymouth Sedan, relied on "heavily" by respondent, was inap-
plicable to the present case as "direct precedent," but "the approach it takes to tainted forfeiture
proceedings is similar to what this Court employs here." 498 F. Supp. at 1327 n.3.
41. 498 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. I11. 1980).
42. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). The Court reapproved Plymouth Sedan in United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433, 447 n.17 (1976).
43. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
44. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961). The primary rationale is deterrence of unconsti-
tutional police conduct. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 468 (1976).
45. See United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 458-59 (1st Cir. 1980)
(Coffin, C.J., dissenting). See note 28 supra. Because property subject to forfeiture proceedings is
not protected against double jeopardy, the government agents, when the property is returned, can
show probable cause and immediately obtain a warrant to reseize the property and initiate a new
forfeiture proceeding. The result will "be little more than a minor irritant to the government and
will... waste judicial time and resources." 621 F.2d at 458-59 (citing One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972)).
46. See notes 15-17 & 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
47. The effectiveness of the exclusionary rule in this regard has been questioned. See, e.g.,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/20
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the government a second opportunity to obtain forfeiture after an ille-
gal seizure, would certainly undermine the police misconduct deter-
rence rationale in the forfeiture context.
An "immunization rule" would also preserve respect for governmen-
tal and judicial integrity as much as does the exclusionary rule in crimi-
nal trials.4" Moreover, the societal cost of this rule is nominal because
"the only loss to the government is its possessory right to property that
has become contraband as a result of its use as an instrument of a
crime. ' 49
By treating forfeiture cases as sui generis,50 courts can vindicate con-
stitutional rights in a manner consistent with both the underlying pur-
poses of the fourth amendment and the Supreme Court's application of
procedural protections to secure personal rights.51 Surely persons can-
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 388, 417 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (police officers do not have the time or inclination to grasp the "nu-
ances" of appellate opinions).
48. Applying the exclusionary rule so as to allow forfeiture if proved by untainted evidence
or permitting the return, reseizure, and initiation of new forfeiture proceedings would do little to
enhance respect for judicial integrity.
49. United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 459 (1st Cir. 1980) (Coffin, C.J.,
dissenting). This is in sharp contrast to the effect of applying exclusionary sanctions in a criminal
trial. There, the result may be the dissolution of the government's case and the liberation of a
guilty criminal. Id. Judge Coffin points out that this is "a social cost we are willing to pay to
preserve the rights guaranteed to all by the Fourth Amendment." Id. But see Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 413-14 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). In view of the recent limitations imposed on the scope of the exclusionary rule, see
note 10 supra and accompanying text, the current Supreme Court may be unwilling to adopt the
"immunization rule" set forth in $38,394 U.S. Currency. See also Note, Forfeiture ofPropery
Used in Connection With CriminalActs, 25 WAYNE L. Rav. 83, 93 (1978).
Professor LaFave notes that "[o]n the merits, it may be said that the conclusion that forfeiture
proceedings need not be quashed merely because the government came by the property to be
forfeited illegally, is no more harsh than the longstanding rule that jurisdiction over a criminal
defendant is not affected by his illegal seizure." I W. LAFAvE, supra note 14, at 85. See United
States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980). But this analysis seems strained. No criminal is re-
turned unpunished to haunt society with his possible future misdeeds as a result of a rule immu-
nizing illegally seized property from forfeiture proceedings. United States v. One 1975 Pontiac
Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 459 (1st Cir. 1980) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting). See 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007,
1008 (1979). One author observes that it requires "some intellectual strain" to justify forfeiture as
satisfying a need for societal vengeance on the basis that "an inanimate object is guilty of an
offense." Id. Therefore, the case for not allowing property (at least property deemed derivative
contraband) to "go free" because of an illegal seizure is a weaker one than refusing to allow a
criminal to go free because of an infirmity in his arrest.
50. See United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 459 (1st Cir. 1980) (Coffin,
C.J., dissenting).
51. See notes 7-11 supra and accompanying text.
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not be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures"52 if an illegal seizure of a large sum
of money, for example, is considered irrelevant simply because "proba-
ble cause" is independently obtained.53
52. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
53. Admittedly, a number of courts remain unpersuaded by this logic. A prime example is
the Ninth Circuit's approach in United States v. One Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351
(9th Cir. 1974), and John Bacall Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 412 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969).
These cases hold that illegally seized property is subject to forfeiture when the Government can
prove its case by evidence independently derived from the illegal seizure. Bacall Imports and
Harley-Davidson are based on questionable reasoning, however.
The sole cases cited by the Bacall Imports court in support of its holding were Dodge v. United
States, 272 U.S. 530 (1926), and United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321
(1926). Neither Dodge nor One Ford, however, stands for the proposition for which the Bacall
Imports court cited them. The court read these cases as supporting a conclusion that "[t]he mere
fact of the illegal seizure, standing alone, does not immunize the goods from forfeiture." 412 F.2d
at 588. Both cases, however, must be read in the light of the language in Pymouth Sedan, in
which the Court expressly recognized that the issues in Dodge and One Ford were "whether evi-
dence seized by one without statutory authority could be used when its seizure was later ratified by
an official with statutory authority." One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. United States, 380 U.S. 693,
700 n.7 (1965). See Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168, 171 (1st Cir. 1965) (court pointed
out that no fourth amendment violation was present in Dodge). Thus, the cases relied upon by the
Bacalllmports court did not involve the same issues as the case that the court was deciding. The
BacallImports court, in attempting to state what Dodge and One Ford did not stand for, neglected
to state what the cases did stand for. Neither case represents the proposition relied on by the
court.
In Harley-Davidson, the Ninth Circuit quoted Bacall Imports and refused to use its supervisory
powers to immunize an illegally seized motorcycle from forfeiture proceedings. The court stated
that there is "no constitutional distinction for Fourth Amendment purposes between per se and
derivative contraband." 508 F.2d at 352. Both the fabrics in Bacallmports and the motorcycle in
Harley-Davidson were not inherently illegal. Rather, the vice was the manner in which the objects
were imported or used. Id. See note 14 supra. The Harle,-Davidson court reasoned that re-
turning illegally seized contraband when possession of such items is ordinarily legal would be
"unmanageable and in many cases arbitrary." 508 F.2d at 352. This logic seems less than com-
pelling, and it is unsupported by case law.
The Harley-Davldson court's reasoning stands in contradistinction to the fact that almost all
courts have recognized that per se contraband is always subject to forfeiture, regardless of the
legality of the seizure. In Plymouth Sedan, the Supreme Court pointed out that the car in ques-
tion, although labeled "contraband," was "quite different." 380 U.S. at 699. See, e.g., Berkowitz
v. United States, 340 F.2d 168, 174 (Ist Cir. 1965); Melendez v. Shultz, 356 F. Supp. 1205, 1209
(D. Mass. 1973). See also notes 14 & 24-26 supra and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit's
reasoning with regard to derivative, as opposed to per se, contraband is flawed. There is no plau-
sible reason why a court would have difficulty distinguishing between derivative objects, such as a
motorcycle, and unlawfully possessed property, such as heroin. An illegally seized motorcycle
should be returned to its rightful owner. Illegally seized heroin should not.
The distinction between derivative and per se contrabandwhich the Ninth Circuit fails to see as
significant for fourth amendment purposes, is important and indicates that Bacall Imports and
Harley-Dayidson are incorrect decisions. See notes 14 & 24-26 supra and accompanying text. To
the extent that both cases are representative of the reasoning employed by other circuits that have
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Courts should read Plymouth Sedan broadly in light of the Supreme
Court's sweeping language that "the Government [can]not seize evi-
dence in violation of the Fourth Amendment for use in a forfeiture
proceeding."5 4 In $38,394 U.S. Currency,5" the fourth amendment vio-
lation is "not the procurement of evidence, but the act of obtaining
possession of the object itself."' 56 Although it is arguably inconsistent
with decisions in other circuits, 7 the court's holding correctly applies
the relevant policy considerations and current constitutional principles.
The harshness and quasi-criminal nature of forfeiture in combina-
tion with the underlying policies of the fourth amendment mandate a
rule that immunizes illegally seized property from forfeiture."8 An im-
munization rule deters unconstitutional police conduct59 and enhances
public respect for governmental and judicial integrity.60 Most impor-
tantly, the result in $38,394 U.S. Currency ensures vindication of the
fourth amendment's protections of persons and property. 61
E..
rejected an "immunization" rule, they indicate that the court in S38,394 U.S. Currency reached the
correct result.
54. P wymouih Sedan, 380 U.S. at 698. See United States v. One 1976 Cadillac, 477 F. Supp,
879, 884 (E.D, Mich. 1979).
55. 498 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. I1M. 1980).
56. United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 458 (1st Cir. 1980) (Coffin, C.J.,
dissenting). In Melendez v. Shultz, 356 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Mass. 1973), the court stated that al-
lowing an illegally seized automobile to be forfeited is tantamount to "holding that an automobile
could itself be seized in the unbridled discretion of an officer .... The right of the automobile
owner not to have it searched is surely no more worthy of protection than his right not to have it
seized without legal procedure." Id. at 1210. This reasoning is equally applicable to respondent's
money in $38,394 U.S. Currency. The First Circuit's analysis in Berkowitz v. United States, 340
F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1965), is also compelling. See note 28 supra.
57. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
60. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
61. U.S. CONsT. amend IV.
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